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Abstract
Security of energy supply is a top priority of policymakers around the globe,
especially in countries of the economically emerging world. This paper’s aim is to
investigate the link between the mode of governance in four developing countries
and the way policies to secure energy supply are established. The paper looks
at the four “BRIC” countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. These countries
are experiencing rapid economic growth and poverty alleviation but differ in their
modes of governance. The four BRIC countries provide a window into the particular
relationship between governance and energy security policy in developing countries.
From a theoretical stance, a public choice model is applied to energy policies
to develop hypotheses relating the similarities and differences of incentive schemes
between democratic and authoritarian governments to predict policy outcomes. We
hypothesize that authoritarian regimes seek control and the capability to reward
and repress social groups by providing public goods, such as energy supply.
In the first empirical step, the current energy economic performance is exam-
ined by focussing on domestically available resources, de-concentration and de-
centralization of the supply side and energy development indices. Doing so, the paper
modifies the Kaya Identity to figure out the drivers of energy demand. Furthermore,
the paper introduces some metrics such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI)
to measure degrees of concentration and centralization and radar-charts to illustrate
the metrics graphically. According to our calculation, Russia’s electricity generation
park is geographically most centralized. China and Russia have the largest plants by
mean output and show the lowest degree of concentration. Referring to indicators,
ranging from electricity distribution losses, access to electricity, to the consumption
to production ratio, and others, the research finds China to have the most secure
energy supply among the BRIC countries, while India performs poorly.
Energy policies to foster supply security are compared in the paper’s second em-
pirical part. It includes systematic in-depth analyses of the government-driven uti-
lization of National Oil Companies (NOCs) and the construction processes of hydro-
electric dams. China seems to be able to exclude social, political and environmental
costs, prioritizing economic growth over other objectives. This allows Chinese power
plants to be built in a faster and in a cheaper way. Finally, evidence is provided
that authoritarian systems tend to utilize NOCs for their political purpose. The
paper concludes that there is a significant relation between the mode of governance
and the way energy supply is secured. As the rest of the developing world indus-
trializes, investigating the BRIC countries now, during their period of transition,
provides clues into how other developing countries might respond to the challenges
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There are three general goals for energy policy: 1) securing the supply of natural
energy resources, 2) consuming and producing energy in an environmental sustain-
able way, and 3) utilizing energy to allow for economic competitiveness. It is the
challenge of policymakers to balance these goals with portfolios of policies to develop
and utilize energy technologies, expand and extract energy resources, and clean and
protect the environment.
The “BRIC” countries1, Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China, are the
four largest world economies among non-OECD members. Over the last decade,
24% of world GDP growth occurred in the economies of the BRIC countries as their
economies grew from 8% of the world economy to where they stand today at 15%
of global GDP (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010c). Managing rapid
economic expansion has been a key challenge for policymakers in the BRIC states.
Adding to the challenge, large populations demand large quantities of resources,
and in 2009, 42% of the world’s population lived in a BRIC state (The World
Bank, 2010b). Large populations beginning from relative poverty expanding through
rapid economic growth have strained policymakers in the BRIC countries to develop
energy policy to meet the simultaneous challenges posed by the three goals from
above. While the BRIC economies are responsible for both a large fraction of world
output and of world output growth, on a per-capita basis, they remain among the
poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita less than one-fourteenth that
of Germany’s.
Policymakers in the BRIC states aspire to steer their rapidly growing economies
toward the level of development enjoyed by the richest countries. High levels of cap-
ital investment and consumption growth will likely keep output growth rates high as
the BRIC countries continue in their economic transition. During transition, energy-
intensive industries will demand affordable and reliable sources of energy feedstocks
and electric power, forcing the economics growth-focused BRIC governments to rank
securing and managing energy supply among their top national priorities.
BRIC countries, with the exception of the Russian Federation, have not fully
achieved energy autonomy, the capability of (net) domestic primary energy supply
to entirely meet domestic demand. Table 1 shows the average annual percent changes
in energy production and consumption in the BRIC countries, revealing how rapidly
both supply and demand for energy grew between 1980 and 2007. In absolute
term, the difference between the growth rate of production and the growth rate of
consumption shows the growing excess demand in each country but Russia. In China
and India, the growth rate in energy consumption has outpaced the growth rate in
1“BRIC” countries is a term introduced by Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jim O’Neill in 2001
(Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003).
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production. Adding pressure to the BRIC countries’ abilities to meet their own
domestic energy demand, fossil fuels are finite resources with depletion occurring at
ever increasing rates.
Table 1: Primary Energy Indicators
Brazil Russia India China
Change in Energy Production (%) 5.72 0.85 5.61 5.32
Change in Energy Consumption (%) 3.52 -0.70 6.00 5.86
Change in Net Energy Balance (%) 2.20 1.55 -0.38 -0.55
Net Energy Balance (quad. Btu) -1.97 16.59 -2.12 -0.08
Time: 1980 - 2007; average annual change
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010b); U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2010c).
Figure 1 illustrates how consumption is rising faster than production in China and
India while Russia’s production has outpaced its consumption and Brazil’s increased
energy demand has been met with roughly equivalent domestic supply.










































Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010b); U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2010c).
Today, the BRIC economies consume 28% of global primary energy, yet on a per
capita basis, consumption of energy in BRIC countries is just 24% of the average per
capita energy consumption in OECD countries (U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration, 2010c). As the BRIC economies continue to grow, barring any dramatic
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shifts in technological deployment, their total energy demand per capita will begin
to increasingly look like that of wealthier nations. With over 40% of global popu-
lation, if the BRIC countries consumed as much energy as the OECD countries on
a per capita basis, holding all else constant, global energy demand would grow by
90%.
To understand the drivers of energy consumption, we need to clarify which trends
drive energy consumption and to what extend they are doing so. The Kaya Iden-
tity (1990), shown in Equation (1) and based on the relationships first described
by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), was originally developed as an exact decomposi-
tion of human influence on potential social and technical drivers. Inspired by the
Kaya Identity, we decompose demand for energy into population, technological and















Under the decomposition of energy demand in Equation (2), a country’s total
energy demand, D, is the product of its energy efficiency of economic output, D/Y ,
its GDP per capita, Y/P , and the size of its population, p. Table 2 quantifies these
indicators and provides data on the parameter changes in the BRIC states. Between
2000 and 2007, energy demand grew in each of the BRIC states. China’s energy
demand rose by 10.1% p.a. India follows with a mean demand growth of 5.0% p.a.
Brazil comes third with 2.6% p.a. and Russia’s energy demand grew by 1.6% p.a.
Table 2: Modified Kaya Identity
Brazil Russia India China
D 0.026 0.016 0.050 0.101
D/Y -0.008 -0.051 -0.021 0.000
Y/p 0.021 0.076 0.055 0.095
p 0.014 -0.005 0.016 0.006
Time: 2000 - 2007; mean annual growth
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010b).
It is of interest to figure out the key drivers of the growing demand. We cal-
culate the annual growth rate of the Kaya decomposition factors using [(Y/p)t −
(Y/p)t−1]/(Y/p)t−1. According to our data above, GDP per capita (Y/p) had the
strongest impact on the rise in energy demand. In each of the BRIC states (Y/p)
rose. China leads the increase by an average growth rate of 9.5% p.a. It is followed
by Russia (7.6% p.a.), India (5.5% p.a.) and Brazil (2.1% p.a.). The energy inten-
sity of GDP, (D/Y ), had a negative effect on the energy demand in Russia (-5.1%
p.a.), India (-2.1% p.a.) and Brazil (-0.8% p.a.). It did not change Chinese energy
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demand. While Russia’s declining population-growth-rate (-0.5% p.a.) loosened the
pressure on energy demand, in India (1.6% p.a.) and Brazil (1.4% p.a.) the growth
of population contributes to the energy demand. China’s population growth (0.6%
p.a.) ranges below India’s and Brazil’s. This can be attributed to the country’s
one-child-policy. Figure 2 illustrates the trends for past and projected years. Pro-
jections for 2015-2035 by the EIA (2010b) show energy intensity falling and GDP
per capita rising in the BRIC states, suggesting that economic growth may be able
to continue in the BRIC countries if they become more energy efficient.





















































































































Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010c); U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2010b).
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 applies a public choice model to
energy policy in authoritarian systems. We derive three hypotheses from the theo-
retical considerations of how types of governments create policies for energy security.
They are quantified and tested in section 3.2, 4.1.3 and 4.2, respectively. While this
section outlined the similarities among the BRIC states in terms of recent economic
history and current economic position, section 2 draws a distinction between the
BRIC states in their mode of governance. Following the Freedom House Index, we
consider India and Brazil to be democratic regimes and China and Russia to be
authoritarian ones. Section 3 quantifies metrics for assessing the current state of en-
ergy security in the BRIC states. Section 4 describes the policies enacted by BRIC
governments to foster (or in some cases deter) access to energy service, using the
variance in governance modality among the BRIC states to contrast the ability of
the states to secure energy supplies. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory and Design
This section develops the theory of authoritarian governance to provide context for
the empirical analysis in Sections 3 and 4. First, the section develops a public choice
model that explains political behavior of authoritarian regimes. Second, we draw a
connection between the theoretical model and our empirical areas of interest. Third,
we develop three testable hypotheses of the causal relationship between governance
and energy security policy. This section ends with some notes on the methodological
design.
2.1 Public Choice Model
Authoritarian regimes and democracies have different kind of incentive settings that
underly all their actions. Generally speaking, however, we assume both of them
to act rationally in front of their specific incentive-backgrounds. So what is it that
drives dictatorships to rule as they do? We approach this question with the standard
dictatorship model of pubic choice literature. Despite the fact that the literature
usually assumes a dictator to be in charge, we replace this one-person assumption by
a group of leaders: the authoritarian regime. This is only a slight change, since there
exist few differences between dictators and authoritarian regimes (Wintrobe, 1990;
Tullock, 1987). We assume members of the ruling regime to have homogenous policy
objectives just like a dictator would. A shared opinion makes them comparable to a
single dictator when it comes to decision-making. Therefore it is possible to apply
the dictatorship model to authoritarian systems.
More formally, let Y stand for national income and G for the value of a public
good. Due to its character, G fosters national income Y in a way that Y is a function
of G: Y (G), with Y ￿ > 0 and Y ￿￿ < 0. Financing the production of public goods,
the authoritarian regime has to level a proportional tax τ on income Y . Due to the
nature of taxes, τ leads to diminishing Y . According to Mueller (2008) the simplest
way to capture this negative impact of τ on Y is to assume constant elasticity with
respect to the tax rate, η. Hence, the realized income is Yr = Y (1− ητ).
Furthermore, the consumption costs of the authoritarian regime itself needs to be
met by tax revenues, so that τYr = G + C. Although the authoritarian regime is
assumed to be restricted by the budget constraint, it has to be kept in mind that
the regime has the option to“nationalize or confiscate resources directly” (Wintrobe,
1998, 59). This means that the leaders of the authoritarian regime want to maxi-
mize their consumption subject to this budget constraint. Very generally speaking,
authoritarian regimes follow three main goals (Mueller, 2008):
1. consumption
12
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2. power to control the life, mind, and action of the people2
3. security to maintain power
Most important in this context are power and the security to sustain it. The dimen-
sion of power can be understood as the precondition for the other two goals. For
that reason, it is also the most difficult goal to achieve (Tullock, 1987). The security
not to be replaced is the core dimension of our analysis. Combining these goals with
the standard model we drew above, the utility function of the authoritarians leaders
looks as follows:
U(P, S, C) (3)
P , S and C stand for power, security and consumption, respectively. Authoritarian
regimes have an interest in increasing Y because income provides capacity to meet
their own consumption as well as share of wealth that their own supporters require.3
One way of fostering income is to reduce the production of public goods. By this
kind of externalization of costs, production of desired goods can be accelerated and
comes cheaper. Case in point, air pollution or the destruction of parts of their
environment count for environmental costs that can be externalized. The costs have
to be met by some other parts of society, however. To be brief, consumption of
the regime positively affects its will to survive and vice versa. Economic growth is
needed in order to guarantee this relation’s persistence.
Following Wintrobe (1990, 1998), authoritarian states choose different tools to
sustain their power: Loyalty L stands on the one side, repression R on the other.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the loyalty of the citizenship increase with the after-
tax incomes, L = L(Yτ ). Additionally, it is assumed that L￿ > 0, and L￿￿ < 0. The
level of repression is a function of the sum of tax revenues which is devoted to the
activity of repression. It can be written as R = R(TR), with R￿ > 0 and R￿￿ < 0.
As a consequence, authoritarian regimes can try to win the loyalty by making
citizens to be better off. One way of achieving this aim is to provide electrification
infrastructure and electricity, a better energy supply, so to say. The theoretical
model shows that the authoritarian regime can maximize its utility by finding the
equilibrium situation where marginal return from tax-sponsored repression equals
the marginal utility from increased loyalty by not raising taxes (Mueller, 2008).
Selective use is one way to strategically employ the instruments of loyalty and re-
pression (Wintrobe, 1998). The authoritarian leaders can try to gain the loyalty of
those individuals that account most for the success of the regime. In turn, they may
repress those groups that do not contribute to the regime’s survival.
Obviously, authoritarian regimes and democratic parties face a very similar chal-
lenge. Both are trying to win “majorities”. But in the case of the authoritarian
2One extreme example of control is the ideology of Calvinism (Bernholz, 1997).
3Examples for the “consumption” of authoritarian regimes can be found in Tullock (1987).
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regime, it is considerably difficult to know which groups are most loyal and which
ones can easily be repressed. This means the regime does not always know who
belongs to the opposition since this group faces a disincentive - namely repression
- to uncover. As a consequence, the authoritarian regime lives in uncertainty dis-
tinguishing between friends and enemies. This is a dilemma and the regime needs
to deal with it (Wintrobe, 1998). All groups have an incentive to simulate support
even if they are actually working against the regime. Thus, the authoritarian regime
need to reassure which groups is on its side and which one is not.
Translating this dilemma to rational choice theory, the authoritarian regime has
to deal with the difficulty of credibly receiving signals of trust and support by parts
of the citizens (Wintrobe, 1998). In order to avoid costs that are attached to the
reassurance process, the authoritarian regime may be reluctant to repress its citizens
too much. In case the regime uses repression excessively, the information about
true supporters is getting worse because the disincentive for opposition to uncover
increases. Therefore, state-run “[t]errorist methods are a sign of weakness rather
than of strength” (Cobban, 1971).
One way of solving this dilemma is ideology. It allows the regime to identify
winners and losers of governmental policy. Communism for instance is one possibility
to solve the dilemma by differentiating among the citizens by economic interest.
Wintrobe (1998) also mentions other features to approach the signaling problem.
Often, a “free-rider” option does not exist; instead political participation is rewarded
by the government. Furthermore, party membership can be seen as an exclusive
privilege.
Rent distribution, however, is the most important instrument. The easiest way of
distributing rents is to create shortages in the first place. In return, fixing shortages
creates rents for the authoritarian regime. These rents can be used for the own
consumption or for distribution among the supporters.
To sum up, from a public choice perspective, it is assumed that authoritarian
regimes have three principle goals: consumption, power and security. As a principle
condition security - in the sense of security to maintain power - is pursued. One way
to secure power is to redistribute income. Throughout the next subsection, we draw
the line between energy policy and income.
2.2 Application to Energy Policy
Despite the fact that human rights violation, persecution - and other actions direct-
ing that way - are important tools to repress parts of the society, at this point, we
concentrate on the role of energy policy. How do the goals of consumption, power
and security affect energy policy? To put it the other way round, how can energy
policy be used to reach these goals?
14
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It is not the aim of the paper to analyze tax policy, hence, we consider tax rates to
be given. Instead we focus on the influence of energy policy on income. Therefore,
we assume income Y as a function of Y (G, E) with ∂Y/∂E > 0 and ∂2Y/∂E2 < 0.
G stands for the amount of public goods and E as the amount of energy.
Energy is a rather general expression. In our analysis, it falls into primary energy
and secondary energy. Resources such as coal, natural gas and oil belong to the group
of primary energy. Electricity and heat are examples for secondary energy because
they are generated from primary sources. In our case, both types are important. For
that reason, we will discuss primary and secondary energy im more detail throughout
sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Another option would be to assume the supply
of energy having the character of a public good which is provided by state-owned
monopolists. In both cases, better energy supply increases the overall amount of
public goods and this increases income Y .4
Reliable energy supply boosts economic growth and income. Following Toman
and Jemelkova (2003) this is what drives the causal relation:
• Lighting enhances labor productivity.
• Reliable energy supply augments the capital stock, allowing capital to be used
more effectively.
• Reduction of communication and transportation costs.
• Reallocation of time from energy production to income generation and educa-
tion.
According to these aspects, reliable energy supply contributes to economic growth.
Authoritarian regimes can use energy policy to foster economic growth by construct-
ing and maintaining a secure, efficient, and affordable energy infrastructure. In turn,
the regime can win the loyalty of parts of the population that have not had access
to these goods before. Wintrobe (1998) even notes that due to the necessary re-
distribution of income for securing the regime security, the levels of redistribution
are higher than in democracies. The other way round, the exclusion from energy
supply can be used as a tool of repression. Moreover, the regime can repress parts of
the society by letting them bear the burdens of constructing and maintaining power
plants.
Since the authoritarian regime reserves parts of the income satisfying its own
demand, the remaining income for society is smaller than it would be without the
rent-seeking regime. Hence the leaders try to balance the losses for society (and for
their supporters) by other means. One possible solution is the externalization of
costs as mentioned in section 2.1.
4Toman and Jemelkova (2003) postulate a similar relation between income and energy.
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While energy supply comes with various advantages, some indisputable costs ap-
pear as well. To be more precise, this group of external cost contains pollution,
negative effects on biosphere and diversity, reallocation of people, expropriation,
and the like. While it is extremely difficult for democratic governments to find a
broadly accepted solution to these problems, authoritarian regimes can use the polit-
ically motivated distribution of external costs to repress or reward groups according
to their loyalty towards the regime.
To sum up, in authoritarian systems, the total welfare for society is lower than
in theoretical pure capitalist societies because the ruling class extracts rents from
the public and distorts incentives for productivity. In order to balance these losses
for society, an authoritarian regime can externalize energy plant construction and
maintaining costs to the population and the environment. At the same time, it
can reward favored groups with enhanced energy supply and increased economic
performance.
2.3 Hypotheses
Summing up on what has been put forward in the subsections above, it can be said
that authoritarian regimes seek to control the production of public goods, such as
energy supply. They need to control the production and/or distribution processes
in order to be capable to repress and reward certain groups of society. The most
direct way of controlling a utility is owning it. Therefore, our first hypothesis claims
that
• Authoritarian regimes use NOCs to gain greater control over - and profits from
- domestically available oil and gas resources.
Our theoretical assumptions above also proposed that authoritarian regimes are
rational actors that strive to minimize costs of production of the desired good as
well as the costs of control. Since economic costs of building and maintaining a
plant are rather fixed, the authoritarian regime needs turn to soft costs instead.
Therefore, our second hypothesis claims that
• Authoritarian regimes care less about costs that can be externalized to society
and the environment. As a consequence, power plants can be constructed in
a faster and in a cheaper way.
The costs of control are lower if there are only a few decisive producers and distrib-
utors to be controlled. In turn, a de-centralized and autonomous production parks
and grids increase the necessary effort to keep the grip on the system. Therefore,
the third hypothesis claims that
• In authoritarian states, energy production is more concentrated than in demo-
cratic countries.
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By discussing the state of supply security, section 3.2 also defines indicators on
the third hypothesis. Section 4 is committed to evaluate policies adopted to foster
supply security. It also proves the second hypothesis by describing how costs are
externalized in constructing large-scale plants. Section 4.2 gives an insight in NOCs
and therefore the first hypothesis. In the end, section 5 validates and falsificates the
hypotheses.
2.4 Design
Since our hypotheses draw on the theory of authoritarian regimes, the central cases
need to be states that are considered to be governed by such a regime. China and
Russia belong to this group since the Freedom House Index (2010) (FHI) ranks them
as “non-free”. In the 1 to 7 point ranking5 Russia scores 5.5 points and falls in a
group with Rwanda, Qatar and others. China (6.5) comes behind and is grouped
with Belarus and Cuba for instance. As has been shown in section 1, India and Brazil
nicely fit to China and Russia with regard to the economic development and energy
economic situation. Both are democracies, therefore, they receive the FHI-label
“free”. We use Brazil and India to control the findings on China and Russia. Since
the latter ones are ruled by authoritarian regimes and the basic conditions are more
or less similar, we draw back differences in energy policy (dependent variable) on
the type of governance (independent variable). This procedure of fixing conditions
while testing different outcomes for one independent variable is commonly called
Most Similar Case Design (MSCD) (Lauth et al., 2009).6
Energy policy in the BRIC countries is worth examining because of the major
role BRIC countries are playing in setting global environmental, energy, security,
and economic policy. However, energy policy in BRIC countries is even more crucial
to understand as other developing countries attempt to emulate the process of eco-
nomic emergence the BRICs have undertaken. Disentangling the “good” and “bad”
governance approaches in the four BRIC countries as it relates to energy policy will
improve understanding of the options available to the other developing countries
as they begin to face even larger challenges managing their own natural energy re-
sources and energy imports, and satisfying the demand for energy services among
their own richer populations.
5The value “1” stands for free countries. The least free of the worst dictatorships receive a “7”
and the label “non-free”(Freedom House, 2010).
6South Africa, Mexico, Turkey and other rapidly emerging democratic economies also qualify for
the Brazil and India group. Respecting scale and scope of this article, however, we decided to
restrict to four cases and conduct our research in depth instead.
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3 Energy Economic State of Supply Security
The section above has given information about this paper’s aim and scope. It is now
time to turn to the core analysis. In the following, we will thoroughly discuss how
“security of supply” can be translated from a rather theoretical goal to empirical
reality. Therefore, we split the generic term into parts.
Primary energy supply security is what is commonly referred to as the ability of
the domestic supply side to meet current and short to medium-run expected en-
ergy demand. In case the domestic energy production does not equal the required
amount of energy demanded by domestic consumers such as the industry and private
households, international trade balances the difference. In the reverse case, in coun-
tries where energy supply is greater than energy demand, energy resources can be
exported to foreign customers or left in reserves for future consumption. Importing
energy resources increases the risk of domestic energy supply security because the
availability of international trade partners inherently uncertainty. To illustrate this
point, the power politics played on the back of oil price shocks by the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can negatively impact energy-intensive
industries.
Electricity delivery and energy reliability is another piece of the energy security
puzzle. In order to guarantee the delivery of primary energy such as oil and gas to
power stations, pipelines need to be built and maintained. Additionally, electricity
requires investment in network infrastructure since electric grids transmit power from
power plants to end-users. Rural development relies on investment in energy and
electricity infrastructure. Private operators, quasi-private operators and state-owned
operators secure the transmission and distribution of energy and power to both
urban and rural areas. However, with all physical resource infrastructure systems, it
is pivotal to avoid bottle-necks, leakage in transit, or drops in quality (e.g. voltage)
in order to maintain network security.
The following subsections 3.1 and 3.2 focus on examining to what extend security
of supply has been achieved in the BRIC states. First, indicators are developed and
detailed. Second, a way of quantifying these indicators is provided. Finally, the
subchapters offer empirical results. The purpose of the radar-charts at this section’s
end (3.3), is to illustrate the state of supply security graphically. Afterwards, section
4 concentrates on energy policies of the BRIC governments to meet their respective
challenges.
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3.1 Domestically Available Resources
In this section, we examine the current energy mixes of the BRIC countries, the
role of international energy trade, and the resource bases of both fossil fuels and
renewable energy. The BRIC countries face a wide range of challenges with respect
to managing and securing their access to energy resources. And in the evolution of
their energy systems, each BRIC country’s effort to secure its supply of energy has
been greatly shaped by its natural resource endowments.
By primary energy consumption, the BRIC countries are among the largest nine
in the world and are the four largest among non-OECD members. In 2009, the
BRIC countries were among the 6 largest consumers of oil, the 23 largest consumers
of coal, and the 20 largest consumers of natural gas. In terms of total fossil energy
reserves, on an energy content basis, the BRIC countries are among the top 20.
The BRIC countries’ coal reserves are among the largest 11, their oil reserves are
among the 21 largest, and their natural gas reserves are among the 35 largest (US
Energy Information Administration 2010c). Figure 3 shows the reserves by type of
fossil resource for the countries with the largest fossil resources in the world. Recent
annual consumption is also shown for comparison.
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3.1.1 China
Energy from coal dominates China’s energy consumption mix. In 2008, 70% of
Chinese energy consumption came from coal while oil supplied an additional 20%.
Hydroelectric generation supplied 6% of Chinese energy consumption and natural
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gas, nuclear and renewables contributed less than 3% each to total energy consump-
tion. Chinese coal reserves were the third-largest in the world at 126 billion short
tons in 2005, behind the United States (264 billion short tons) and Russia (173 bil-
lion short tons). At 3.2 billion tons, China produced 44% of the world’s coal in 2009,
making it the world’s largest producer of coal, 3 times larger than the second-largest
producer, the United States. At its 2009 coal production rate, China’s coal reserves
will deplete in 39 years. Of the 10 largest coal producers in 2009, only Indonesia
would deplete its reserves faster than China if production rates stayed constant. In
all likelihood substantial new resources will be added to Chinese coal reserves, while
coal imports from Indonesia, Australia, Vietnam, Mongolia and Russia continue to
grow. Since 2002, China has significantly increased its coal imports: from 2002 to
2008, Chinese coal imports grew over 400%. Nevertheless, coal imports still made
up only 3.8% of total coal consumption in China in 2009 (US Energy Information
Administration 2010a).
Since 1993, China has been a net importer of oil as oil consumption has grown
faster than domestic oil production. China’s net oil import rate was 3.5 million
barrels/day in 2008 – 50% of its total consumption – making it the world’s 3rd largest
net importer of oil behind the United States (9.8 million barrels/day) and Japan
(4.0 million barrels/day). The largest oil exporters to China are Saudi Arabia (725
thousand barrels/day), Angola (596 thousand barrels/day), and Iran (425 thousand
barrels/day) (US Energy Information Administration 2010a). The depletion of older
onshore wells in China is leading to growing attention to offshore oil resources, some
of which are in disputed ocean territories (French, 2005), as well as onshore resources
deeper in western China. Natural gas does not currently play a significant role in
the Chinese economy, but the lower emission profile of natural gas power plants
relative to coal-fired plants, may lead to an expansion of natural gas in China in
the near future. Gas pipelines from Eastern Siberia into China are likely to move
forward (BBC News, 2006) as China seeks to simultaneously increase development
of domestic, including offshore, natural gas resources.
China doubled its wind capacity in 2009 to nearly 26 GW, giving it the second
largest installed capacity in the world behind the United States. While wind cur-
rently only supplies less than half of one percent of China’s electricity, the wind
on-shore resources available in China are enough to generate 24.7 PWh, greater
than seven times current Chinese electricity consumption. Relative to prevailing
contract prices, the on-shore wind resource in China could still provide more than
twice current electricity consumption. China also has a substantial offshore wind
resource base, particularly in South China in the Straight of Taiwan. China’s best
solar resources are concentrated in the west, near China’s borders with India and
Nepal (McElroy et al., 2009).
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3.1.2 India
Like China, India uses coal to provide a majority of its energy. 53% of Indian energy
demand was met with coal in 2006 while oil provided an additional 31%. Natural
gas, hydroelectric and a small share of nuclear made up the balance. In 2007, 8.7%
(net of exports) of Indian coal consumption was imported.
India’s domestic oil production has been nearly constant since 1990 while oil con-
sumption has grown nearly three-fold in the same time period. By 2008, India was
the 5th largest consumer of oil at 2.8 million barrels/day and the 4th largest net
importer of oil with over 2.5 million barrels/day in net imports. The largest oil
importers to India are Saudi Arabia (644 thousand barrels/day), Iran (476 thou-
sand barrels/day), Nigeria (308 thousand barrels/day), and Iraq (280 thousand bar-
rels/day) (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010c).
As in China, natural gas demand is expected to grow in India as the detrimental
effects of pollution from coal power plants increase and as major domestic gas plays
go into production. When it is complete, the 3,500 MW power plant at Dadri, Uttar-
Pradesh will be the largest natural gas-fired plant in the world. Since 2004, India
has been a net importer of natural gas, utilizing significant quantities of liquefied
natural gas (254 Bcf in 2006) while also seeking to expand its pipeline connections
to other countries, such as Iran (US Energy Information U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2010c).
3.1.3 Brazil
Unlike China and India, Brazil does not rely heavily on coal for electricity generation.
Instead, 85% of Brazil’s electricity comes from hydroelectric dams. Natural gas, coal,
nuclear, and renewables make up the balance. For liquid fuels, Brazil consumed 2.5
million barrels/day of petroleum in 2008; however, all gasoline sold in Brazil is
blended with ethanol. In 2008, Brazil produced 454 thousand boe/day of ethanol
and 20 thousand boe/day of biodiesel. Currently, Brazil consumes more oil than
it produces. However, because of significant biofuel production, combined with
large offshore petroleum resource discoveries in the past three years, Brazilian oil
production is expected to continue growing faster than its oil consumption.
Brazil has the smallest proved reserves of fossil energy among the BRIC countries.
However, the pre-salt fields off near the coast of Rio de Janeiro, discovered in 2007,
could dramatically shift Brazil’s oil reserve status. While the Brazilian pre-salt
fields are still being explored, by some estimates, the size of this resource could put
Brazilian reserves on par with the countries with the five largest oil reserves in the
world (Wheatley, 2010).
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3.1.4 Russia
Russia has the largest fossil energy reserves of the BRIC countries on an energy
content basis and the second largest fossil energy reserves in the world behind the
United States. Russia’s economy is strongly dependent on energy exports. Over
one-fifth of the country’s GDP is derived from its oil and gas industry. At 183
billion cubic meters, Russia is the largest natural gas exporter in the world, 85%
larger than the world’s second largest gas exporter, Norway. 96% of Russian gas
exports are transported via pipeline to Europe. Almost all of the remaining 4% of
Russian gas exports are exported as liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asia (BP Stat
Review).
Russia’s natural gas reserves are the world’s largest: nearly 70% larger than Iran’s,
the second largest. 27% of all proven gas reserves in the world and 53% of all non-
OPEC gas reserves are in Russia. At 2009 production rates, assuming no reserve
increases, Russian gas reserves would deplete in 84 years, longer than the global
average of 63 years and the North American average of just 11 years. Domestically,
natural gas provided 55% of Russia’s energy consumption in 2005. Russia’s coal
reserves are the world’s second largest, yet only 16% of Russia’s domestic energy
consumption was derived from coal in 2005. Russia’s oil reserves are the world’s
eighth largest.
3.2 De-concentration and Development
Above, we overviewed the state of diversification of energy production as well as
domestically available resources. In the following, we complete the picture of sup-
ply security by focusing on degrees of de-concentration (3.2.1) and de-centralization
(3.2.2) of energy production parks. Additionally, we discuss how both characteristics
can be used to support rural development (3.2.3 and 3.2.4). However, increasing ur-
banization of the population, which increases urban energy demand, puts constraints
on both ideas.
3.2.1 De-concentration
De-concentration of the supply side means to share the total amount of production
among a larger number of producers. The security advantage of de-concentration
lies in the fact that a polypolistic generation park can mitigate the loss of a small
share much better while a highly concentrated situation can hardly cope with the
shortage caused by the failure of a big producer. Just consider the case of taking
a nuclear station temporally off the grid because of an incident. The concentrated
case of having some big plants supplying the big share of electricity reacts with a
rise in prices or additional import.
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Taken by the average plant size, China has the largest plants among the BRICs.
It is followed by Russia. Brazil comes third while India’s production park is four
times more de-concentrated than the Chinese one. The Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index
(Hirschman, 1964), a common economic index to quantify concentration, offers an
alternative scenario. The HHI estimates the degree of concentration by aggregating
the quadratic sizes a2 of each plant i. The result ranges between 0 (atomically








While having the largest plants by average size, China’s production park is least
concentrated if measured by the HHI. Russia shows the same phenomenon. The
high concentration rate in Brazil falls back on the large production share of the
Itaipú Dam. India as well is relatively de-concentrated in terms of the HHI.
Table 3: Concentration Indicators
Brazil Russia India China
Average plant electricity
generation (MWh)
669,817 1,358,044 466,916 1,919,078
HHI of all power plants
by their output
344 95 100 26
Number of plants 643 660 1541 1,701
Aggregated electricity
generation (MWh)
430.692.291 896.308.902 719.518.179 3.264.351.803
Time: 2007
Source: own calculation on the base of CARMA (2010).
Our third hypothesis claimed that authoritarian system fall back on concentration
measures in order to secure control over the supply system. This hypothesis is partly
correct only. As our data show, Russia and China have the largest plants by the
average output size. These countries, however, also show up with the relatively
lowest level of concentration (HHI) among the BRICs. Our hypothesis seems to be
falsified. Nonetheless, it is worth examining how results change by replacing output
concentration measures by geographical concentration measures. This is the next
subsection’s aim.
3.2.2 De-centralization
The term de-centralization stands for de-concentration from a geographical perspec-
tive. The security advantage is two-fold. First, if many producers are centralized at
one place, the shortage caused by a geographically concentrated incident is bigger
than in the de-centralized scenario. Second, the BRIC states have in common that
they belong to the geographically largest countries on earth. Placing solar panels or
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wind turbines throughout the country uses the fact that solar radiation moves dur-
ing the day. Also the wind blows at different places. While one part of the country
faces sunset or changing winds, another may offer just the right intensity or speed,
respectively. Therefore, de-centralization makes the supply side less vulnerable to
geographically focused earthly and human shocks and uses the country’s large size
to hedge changing gradients of wind, sun and water.
Urbanization, however, requires power generation to be available at places where
many people life. Therefore, the degree of de-centralization is limited by the degree
of urbanization. In order to integrate both aspects, the following quantifications
of regional electricity generation are always divided through regional population or
regional GDP.
The quantification goes two ways. On the one hand, we calculated each region’s
electricity generation-to-population ratio. With regard to this indicator, Russia is
the country with the highest de-centralizations degree. We derive this information
from the variance and standard deviation of the regional generation-to-population
ratio among the BRICs. Case in point, Khakass, a federal subject in the South of
Siberia, produces more than 2300 time as much electricity per person than Kalmykia
at the Caspian Sea. Russia is followed by Brazil and China. India’s production park
is relatively de-centralized, instead.
Table 4: Centralization Indicators 1
Regional Electricity Generation to Regional Population Ratio
Brazil Russia India China
Lowest (MWh/p) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.93
Highest (MWh/p) 9.75 7.73 1.82 47.39
Average (MWh/p) 2.00 6.77 0.62 2.75
Variance (MWh/p)2 4.93 57.25 0.22 2.64
Standard Variance
(MWh/p)
2.22 7.57 0.47 1.62
Time: 2007
Source: own calculation on the base of CARMA (2010).
On the other hand, we calculated the variances and standard deviations of the
regional electricity generation-to-GDP ratio. The picture slightly changes. Russia,
however, still shows the highest geographical concentration of electricity generation
per GDP. This time, India comes second. Following up, Brazil and China are pretty
close to each other. Remarkably, the generation-to-GDP ratio proves the decentral-
ization degree of India to be lower than the one from the generation-to-population
degree. The reason may be an industrial one. While people in rural areas make
their living from agriculture business, the energy-intensive industries of the Indian
State of Uttar Pradesh, for example, require the generation of more electricity.
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Table 5: Centralization Indicators 2
Regional Electricity Generation to Regional GDP Ratio
Brazil Russia India China
Lowest (MWh/mil.US$) 1.75 7.77 33.50 54.84
Highest (MWh/mil.US$) 1,728 10,328 3,054 2,088
Average (MWh/mil.US$) 369 1.297 960 714
Variance
(MWh/mil.US$)2
209,424 2,561,285 650,449 255,434
Standard Variance
(MWh/mil.US$)
458 1,600 807 505
Time: 2007
Source: own calculation on the base of CARMA (2010).
The following charts 4 precisely depict how much electricity is generated per GDP
in each of the regions. Russia’s highly centralized production park is eye-catching.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculation on the base of CARMA (2010).
Let us turn to our third hypothesis again. While subsection 3.2.1 rejected the
hypothesis, this subsection verifies our assumption. Both measures - the generation-
to-population ratio and the generation-to-GDP ratio - approve that Russia’s pro-
duction park is relatively centralized. One reason is that the country’s rich fossil
resources are concentrated in Siberia. The other BRICs change places in the rank-
ing due to different quantifications. In general, large-scale projects, such as the
Belo Monte in Brazil or the Three Gorges Dam in China shift the production park
towards centralization, of course.
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3.2.3 Advantages of Small Scale Projects vs. Economies of Scale
Tackling rural underdevelopment, de-centralization and de-concentration are inter-
linked with each other. The reason is that building small-scale plants (de-concentration)
in villages (de-centralization) support rural electrification that is a stepping-stone of
rural economic development.
According to Shih and Wirtshafter (1990), small plants provide several advantages
over large plants with regard to rural development. First, small size plants can be
operated and maintained by local authorities. These lower federal levels are able
to finance and secure the equipment, to command the construction, and to control
the outcome. The latter means they can profit by taxing the outcome. Therefore,
small-scale projects can provide income for local authorities. In turn; this input can
foster rural economic development and political independence from the federal state.
Second, large-scale projects require large-scale upfront investment and supervision
at a higher level in the federal system. Especially when it comes to negotiations,
large-scale investors do barely meet with local authorities, but in eye-level with state
policymakers. Third, small hydro plants, for example, often substitute small coal-
fired plants in rural areas. Therefore they reduce carbon dioxide emissions, which
is obviously an environmental advantage. Fourth, the construction design of small
plants is often standardized. Having many similar plants, therefore, shortens the
process of constructing a station. Large-scale construction usually requires more
time and capital than expected (Reuters, 2009). Small-scale projects instead are
quickly built and the spread of innovation moves faster among the small (Shih and
Wirtshafter, 1990).
Excluding these impacts on rural development, large-scale projects benefit from
economies of scale effects. This means they provide cheaper investment-to-output
ratios. In subsection 4.1.3, we discuss what kind of social, political and environmen-
tal costs are attached to large-scale projects.
Coming back to our finding in subsection 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, Russia does not seem to
use the advantages of small-scale projects. China as well exploits the economies of
scale effects. Besides this calculation, access to electricity is not as poorly developed
as in India. Therefore, India has an incentive to use the advantages of small-scale
energy production. The following paragraphs will evaluate to what extent the pop-
ulations of the BRIC states have gained access to electricity.
3.2.4 Electricity Generation and Energy Delivery in Rural Areas
In its World Energy Outlook 2004, the IEA first published data on the so-called
Energy Development Index (EDI)7. In 2007, the IEA integrated India’s and China’s
7“To construct the EDI, a separate index was created for each indicator, using the actual maximum
and minimum values for the countries covered. Performance is expressed as a value between
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regions to the data set. Reviewing around 100 emerging economies, the Human
Development Index (HDI) seems to be linked positively to the EDI. For our cases,
this means that further development may also stimulate access to energy and vice
versa. From a static point, the EDI ranks Brazil and China above India in 2007.
Russia is not part of the sample.
Table 6: Energy Development Index
Brazil Russia India China
Clean cooking fuel index (%) 0.874 NA 0.265 0.602
Electricity access index (%) 0.951 NA 0.519 1.000
Electricity generation per
capita index (%)
0.383 NA 0.102 0.306
Energy Development Index 0.736 NA 0.295 0.636
Time: 2007
Source: International Energy Agency (2007).
While the EDI nicely illustrates performances at the aggregated country level,
henceforward, we make a difference between rural and urban development. Doing
so, the state of energy delivery becomes more precise. The next figure 5 and the
table 7 below show India being in the most striking position. By far, the country
has the lowest urbanization rate which means that the majority of the people life in
rural areas.
0 and 1, calculated using the following formula: Dimension index = (actual value – minimum
value)/(maximum value – minimum value). The index is then calculated as the arithmetic
average of the three values for each country” (International Energy Agency, 2007).
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010d); UN Population Division (2010).
Table 7: Urbanization Indicators
Brazil Russia India China
Rural population (thou-
sands)
26,326 37,665 850,005 718,307
Urban population (thou-
sands)
169,098 102,702 364,459 635,839
Urban population (%) 87 73 30 47
Rural annual growth rate
(%, 2010-2015)
-1.98 -7.40 0.78 -1.01
Urban annual growth
rate (%, 2010-2015)
1.14 -2.00 2.38 2.29
Population living in
cities >10mil. (%)
19 10 16 5
Population living in
cities 5-10mil. (%)
3 0 9 8
Population living in
cities 1-5mil. (%)
25 15 17 25
Time: 2010
Source: UN Population Division (2010).
As can be seen in table 8, more than 50% - or 404 million people - live without
access to electricity in India. Russia meets OECD like electrification standards while
Brazil and China have not achieved full coverage yet.
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Table 8: Access to Electricity
Brazil Russia India China
Total (%) 98 100 65 99
Urban (%) 100 100 93 100
Rural (%) 88 100 52 99
Population without elec-
tricity access (mil.)
1.1 0.0 404.5 8.0
Time: 2008
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010d).
India’s poor performance is mirrored by the rural poverty rate, as can be seen in
table 9. China, repeatedly, shows up the relatively best state of rural development.
Table 9: National Poverty Rate
Brazil Russia India China
Total (%) 17 31 29 5
Urban (%) 13 NA 25 <2
Rural (%) 33 NA 30 5
Time: 2008
Source: World Resource Institute (2009).
As Kelli (2010) points out, India’s lack of decent energy supply and the generally
underdeveloped rural areas result in the emergence of a private energy production
system that runs side-by-side with the public system. Increasingly, companies rely on
their own captive power generation instead of the expensive and bureaucratic state-
run energy delivery. Recent legislation allows captive producers to use the public
grid for energy delivery. This “open access clause” may boost further investment in
private installation (Kelli, 2010).
To sum up, India still has a long way to go. China and Russia do increasingly
well. In Brazil rural poverty is a major problem (32.6% of rural population lives in
poverty). Access to electricity, however, is widely available.
3.3 Radar charts
Figure 6 nicely illustrates the BRIC states’ performances by applying radar-charts
(Borgelt and Kruse, 2002). First, six indicators (see table 10) have been standard-
ized.
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Table 10: Radar Chart Data
Brazil Russia India China
Rural Non-
Electrification Ratio
-0.14 -0.68 1.45 -0.63
Energy Consumption to
Production Ratio
1.43 -0.07 -0.55 -0.81
HHI of all power plants
by their output
1.46 -0.33 -0.29 -0.83
Standard Deviation of
the Regional Electricity
Generation to GDP Ra-
tio




-1.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Electricity Distribution
Losses
-1.11 -0.59 0.86 0.83
Time: 2007; standardized values.
Second, the values are drawn onto a multi-axis graph. The resulting country-
specific positions are connected. And the connected dots create a field, the so-called
SMOP-field (Schmid and Förster, 2009).
























With regard to absolute results, the explanatory value is very limited of course.
The purpose of comparing case performances, however, is easily achieved. Since
small fields equal a relatively good performance: China, the supposedly most au-
thoritarian system, scores best among the BRICs.
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4 Policies to Foster Supply Security
The forthcoming section adds up to last section’s findings and asks what policy
makers are actually doing to foster security of supply. Subsection 4.1 is committed
to depicting renewable energy policies in general and hydropower projects in par-
ticular. Subsection 4.2 outlines the relationship between big oil producers and the
government. Of course, a lot more issues are of interest, e.g. the solar branch and
the nuclear industry. Since space is limited, however, further research will need to
focus on these themes.
4.1 Hydropower and Renewable Energy Policy
One aspect of securing the supply of power is to diversify the production portfolio.
In order to do so, the BRIC states intensify their efforts of attracting investment in
hydroelectric power plant systems. Hydropower production is flexible in scale and in
meeting different kinds of demand. Hydro storage and pump station can meet peak-
load demand, while run-of-river plants provide base-load capacity (International
Hydropower Association, 2007). Therefore, the hydropower production park can be
diversified itself. Hydropower is one of the oldest commercially scalable renewable
energy sources, having been deployed around the world for hundreds of years, while
other renewable sources such as photovoltaics, geothermal and wind energy, were
developed more recently only. As can be reviewed in table 11, the installed capacity
is expanding and there is still huge economically exploitable potential in each of the
BRICs as the economically explotable capability proves.
Table 11: Hydropower Capacity
Brazil Russia India China
In place (GW) 13.30 45.70 32.00 145.00
Under construction (GW) 5.50 7.00 7.00 80.00
Construction to installed ca-
pacity ratio (%)
41.35 15.32 21.88 55.17
Planned (GW) 33.00 8.00 9.00 NA
Planned to installed and un-
der construction capacity ra-
tio (%)
175.53 15.18 23.08 NA
Economically exploitable
capability (TWh/yr)
3,000 852 660 1,753
Time: 2007
Source: International Energy Agency (2009); World Energy Council (2007); World Energy Council
(2009).
Brazil is the front-runner in hydropower development. Especially by completing
the Itaipú Dam, it massively increased its energy production and electricity gener-
ation from hydropower.
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Table 12: Hydroelectric Power
Brazil Russia India China
Hydro energy to total
energy production ratio
(%)
14 2 2 2
Hydro electricity to total
electricity generation ra-
tio (%)
84 18 15 15
Time: 2007
Source: International Energy Agency (2010).
4.1.1 Benefits of Hydroelectric Systems
Although it is an essential benefit, hydropower comes with a lot more advantages
than securing the energy supply only.8 First, generating power from hydroelectric
power plants can be a very profitable business. And since there are economies of
scale at work, the benefit of running a dam progressively increases with its output
capacity. The BRIC states have already found out that their massive rivers (e.g.
the Paraná in Brazil, the Volga in Russia, the Ganges in India, and the Yangtze in
China) bear the potential to do good in various ways.
Second, from an economic development perspective, cheap and reliable energy is
a necessity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing and other
energy-intensive sectors. Even when wages are climbing, cheap and reliable energy
enhances competitiveness (The Economist, 2010c). Table 13 shows that a large
share of China and Russia’s GDP is made by the energy-intensive secondary sec-
tor. In India and Brazil, the industrial economy accounts for less and the primary
consumption of energy per Dollar of GDP is lower.
Table 13: Energy Intensity, FDI and Secondary Sector Indicators
Brazil Russia India China
Industrial sector share of
GDP (%)
25.40 34.80 28.20 46.80
FDI to GDP ratio (%) 2.86 4.34 3.55 3.42
Energy intensity (Total
Primary Energy Consump-
tion per US $ of GDP (Btu
per Year 2005 US $ (PPP)))
6,012 15,312 6,543 11,412
Time: 2007
Source: The World Bank (2010b); U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010c).
Third, the production of hydropower does not emit pollutants; therefore, hydro
energy is a climate-neutral source. This environmental advantage also helps to
8Existing disadvantages are discussed in 4.1.3.
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achieve politically defined mitigation targets.9 Figure 7 illustrates the rapidly in-
creasing carbon dioxide emissions. China is especially eye-catching due the size of
total emissions. Without hydropower development, the emissions would grow even
faster.



































































































Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010b); U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2010c); International Energy Agency (2009).
Finally, with regard to social consequences, hydropower can provide reliable sup-
ply of electricity to rural areas where electrification had been low before. In 2008,
there were 404 million people in India without access to electricity. In rural areas,
where only half of India’s households (53%) are connected to the grid, hydropower
can make a difference in people’s life (International Energy Agency, 2009).
As has been argued in subsection 3.2.3, small hydropower supports rural develop-
ment but large-scale plants incorporate economies of scale effects instead. In order
to figure out which size of project is preferred in the BRIC countries, we are leaving
the aggregated level for a moment and focus on single hydropower stations.
The Three Gorges Dam in China, when completed in 2011, will contribute 22.5
GW to the hydro capacity. And there are many more massive hydro dams under
construction in China, such as the Xiluodu (12.6 GW) and the Xiangjiaba (6 GW)
(World Energy Council, 2009). Brazil’s Itaipú (14 GW) and the Belo Monte hy-
9Brazil and China ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, India and Russia followed up in 2004. Be-
sides these voluntary international agreement to reduce GHG emissions, China ratified its own
“Renewable Law” which seeks to increase the renewable share in the national energy portfolio
from 3% to 10% by 2020 (The World Bank, 2010a).
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dropower station (11.2 GW) at the Xingu River also range among the largest dams
in the world. India relies on many small hydroelectric plants instead of a few large
ones. The Subansiri Lower is the biggest project under construction with a capacity
of 2 GW. Four of the fifteen largest hydropower stations in the world are Russian.
Boguchany (3 GW) is one of the current projects (World Energy Council, 2007;
World Energy Council, 2009).
Obviously, the hydropower business thinks big in the BRIC states. Only India
spreads the capacity to many small plants. Especially China and Brazil push forward
the very big projects. By building stations such as the Three Gorges Dam, the
operators benefit from economies of scale. However, there are all kinds of costs that
are attached to the dams and increase with their size as well. We will figure out
which costs occur, furthermore, how policymakers seek to reduce them.
4.1.2 Financing and Promoting Hydropower Projects
Hydro projects begin with immense up-front costs. Therefore, it is a question of
finance whether or not policymakers succeed in their objective to move start capital
to new hydroelectric systems.
The Clean-Development-Mechanism (CDM), a mechanism introduced by the in-
ternationally launched Kyoto Initiative, mobilizes investment in hydropower projects.
At the end of December 2009, 27% of CDM projects were hydropower projects.
Wind (14%) comes second. The top host countries are China, India and Brazil
(International Hydropower Association, 2010).
Domestically, the countries also seek to attract investment from the private sector.
With regard to the lending interest rate, for instance, state-run banking sectors in
China and Russia provide cheaper investment capital than the partly private banking
sectors in Brazil and India. It seems that policymakers of authoritarian regimes can
command banks to give credit to politically desired projects. In China, especially,
these projects tend to be large in scale. The regime’s role in providing capital
became eye-catching in China’s recent attempt to rebound the financial crisis (The
Economist, 2010b). This behavior strongly relates to what Wintrobe (1998) said in
subsection 2.1 on the capability of authoritarian regimes to nationalize resources in
case there is the political need to do so. This time, the required resource is capital
to keep the large-scale projects running smoothly.
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Table 14: CDM Projects
Brazil Russia India China
Number of CDM
projects
35 0 58 354
Share of total CDM
projects (%)
6.35 0.0 10.53 64.25
Lending interest rate 47.30 % 12.20 % 13.30 % 5.30 %
Time: 2009
Source: International Hydropower Association (2010).
Another structural characteristic of electricity markets is the public-private own-
ership ratio. To what extend is the state part of the production, transmission and
distribution of power? Table 15 shows that the upstream part - electricity generation
- is partly liberalized among the BRIC states. Very generally speaking, the produc-
tion park falls in two parts, a private part and a slightly bigger state-run part. When
it comes to the downstream phase, however, China and Russia sustain their grip on
transmission and distribution while Brazil and India release their hands. This proves
our theoretical assumptions to come close to reality. We claimed in subsection 2.3
that authoritarian regimes sustain a big public share of distributional systems in
order to remain in position to reward and repress by providing and cutting public
goods.
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Table 15: Ownership
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Source: CARMA (2010); Central Electricity Regulatory Commission of India (2009); Goldman
Sachs (2007); International Monetary Fund (2010); Kelli (2010); U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (2010a).
While table 15 distinguished between upstream and downstream phases, table 16
shows differences in regulatory designs to foster electricity generation from renew-
able sources in general and from hydroelectric systems in particular. Diversity of
regulatory designs flourishes among the BRICs in promoting renewables. Support
for hydropower, however, seems to be similar in Brazil and India. Both states cre-
ate incentives by a feed-in-tariff. Furthermore, both legislations favor small-scale
projects over large scale ones. While Russia increasingly discovers the potential of
its many small rivers, China commits to large-scale projects.
Both findings bring back the discussion on our second hypothesis. It claimed that
authoritarian systems can externalize costs which come with the fast and cheap
building of stations which are of large scale basically. Democracies need to take
further costs into account. This calculation may lead Brazil and India to favor
small-scale projects by stimulating small-scale private investment.
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Table 16: Regulatory Design




















































































































Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2009); Central Electricity Regula-
tory Commission of India (2009); Goldman Sachs (2007); International Hydropower Association
(2010); International Monetary Fund (2010); Reuters (2009); The World Bank (2010a).
4.1.3 Hydroelectric Large Scale Projects: Brazil vs. China
The concluding subsection compares Brazilian and Chinese project realizations. It
is of interest how the respective policymakers respond to political, social, and envi-
ronmental challenges and costs.
Political costs of building hydroelectric power plants occur if the dammed up
river flies through other countries as well. While downstream neighbors were used
to an uninterrupted flow beforehand, after a dam is built, they may suffer from low
river level, change in river speed and other man made consequences.
As the Bangkok Post reports“China’s dams killing Mekong”(Bangkok Post, 2010).
Storing up the Mekong River lowers the river level of the upstream neighboring coun-
tries. Since Chinese officials refuse to give further information, they act“as a regional
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bully” (The Economist, 2010a). In turn, officials in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and
Vietnam blame China for its uncooperative behavior.
Brazil takes on a different approach towards its neighbors. In order to avoid a
political clash, the Itaipú plant is shared with Paraguay (World Energy Council,
2007). Paraguay also receives electricity from the station. Brazil would not have
had to act friendly towards the small neighboring state; the political costs of non-
cooperation, however, seemed to be too high.
Social and environmental costs occur because damming up rivers will flood
the upstream area. In addition, downstream areas face a drop in the river level and
drying valleys. People, villages and entire cities need to be resettled. Such actions
can stir emotions and protest because moving homes may not be an easy, cheap and
inviting thing to do. The man-made flooding has deep impacts on the biosphere of
the riverbanks and the area behind. Animals living in or close-by the water find
themselves in a new environment. Both changes can have a devastating impact on
biodiversity.
In China, approx. 500,000 people were re-settled during the construction phase
of the Xishuangbanna, the Jinghong and the Xiaowan dams. The Three Gorges
Damn required the resettlement of 1.3 million people (Reuters, 2009). Of course,
the government urges operators to pay compensations and to come up for the re-
settlement cost. Protest however, is repressed. “Those who protest are threatened
with less compensation, if not jail.” (The Economist, 2010a). The 2004 Renewable
Law emphasizes the rigor of Chinese government’s intervention. According to the
third pillar of the “Renewable Law” strengthening especially large-scale projects is
a political objective (The World Bank, 2010a).
Brazil nicely illustrates how public opposition to a project can influence policy-
making and jurisdiction. The dam conglomerate needed to scale down the Belo
Monte station because it faced massive opposition of environmentalists, Indian peo-
ple, and environmental groups from the U.S. and Europe. At the day of decision
“an angry mob” (The Economist, 2010d) was rallying outside the court. As a con-
sequence, plans were changed. “Instead of building a great wall across the Xingu to
create a massive reservoir, Belo Monte is designed as a run-of-river dam, a technique
that harnesses the natural flow of the river to drive the turbines.” (The Economist,
2010d). Obviously, profits from economies of scale effects were exchanged for the
non-monetary goods of social peace and acceptance.
Coming back to our second hypothesis, the comparison of the Belo Monte project
in Brazil with the Chinese constructions at the Yangtze River contrasted how policy-
makers respond to political, social and environmental costs. Generally speaking,
Brazil regards these costs as internal to its cost-benefit calculation while in China,
some costs seem to have second-order status.10 This issue has deep impacts on the
10For further research on social and environmental costs of China’s large-scale hydropower projects
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structure of the hydropower projects: While China can exploit the full potential of
the economies of scale, Brazil scaled down the Belo Monte project. From a purely
qualitative perspective, we consider our second hypothesis to be valid for the two
cases. Further generalization is not doable of course.
4.2 National Oil Companies and their Governments
National oil and gas companies are companies whose controlling shareholder is a
national government. National oil companies vary in the extent to which politi-
cal leaders influence corporate decisions, but generally, the purpose of the govern-
ment controlling an oil and gas company is the perceived importance of using oil
and gas resources for issues of national security, economic development, protecting
the environment, and often most importantly, securing supply of energy resources.
Completely private (i.e. not publicly traded) national oil companies are the largest
corporations in the world (Financial The Financial Times, 2006). Typically, these
companies are based in developing OPEC countries. By greatest 2009 oil production,
the largest of these NOCs are: Saudi Arabian Oil Company, National Iranian Oil
Company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA, Petroleos Mexicanos, Abu Dhabi National Oil
Company, Iraq National Oil Company, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, and Nige-
rian National Petroleum Corporation (Radler and Koottungal, 2009). Further, the
national oil companies that are publicly listed are among the largest publicly listed
companies in the world.
National oil and gas companies (NOCs) exist in both developed countries (e.g.
StatoilHydro in Norway) and developing countries. However, for developing coun-
tries, NOCs represent some of the most important tools developing country govern-
ments have for gaining international influence and power poorer. In this section, we
present a cross-sectional comparative case study of the largest national oil companies
in the BRIC countries. In China, two national oil companies dominate domestic oil
and gas activity. PetroChina (owned by China National Petroleum Corporation)
and Sinopec collectively produce nearly 80% of Chinese oil and nearly all domestic
national gas. PetroChina has typically focused on upstream activity while Sinopec
has traditionally focused on downstream activities. A third Chinese government
controlled oil company, CNOOC plays a smaller role in terms of oil and gas produc-
tion but dominates Chinese offshore oil and gas activity. In Russia, Gazprom and
Rosneft are the large state-controlled oil and gas players. In Brazil, state-controlled
Petrobras is the dominant oil and gas producer and in India, the national oil and
gas company, ONGC, plays a similarly large role.
Of the 50 largest publicly traded NOCs in the world, 11 are NOCs, 8 of which are
in BRIC countries (PFC PFC Energy, 2010). Of the 8 NOCs in BRIC countries,
see Brown and Xu (2010).
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PetroChina is the largest oil producer, OAO Gazprom is the largest natural gas
producer and PetroChina is the largest company (by market capitalization). Table
17 shows 4 recent statistics for the 7 largest NOCs among the BRIC countries:
the share of the NOC owned by the government, the 2009 self-reported production
figures for oil and natural gas and their 2009 market capitalization based on the
share price of the firm’s publicly traded equity on December 31, 2009.














PetroChina China 86% 844 2,112 353
Sinopec China 76% 301 1,687 159
CNOOC China 64% 186 239 70
OAO
Gazprom
Russia 50% 269 16,337 171
Rosneft Russia 75% 796 448 89
Petrobras Brazil 56% 771 500 199
ONGC India 74% 240 969 54
Time: 2009
Source: 8 annual reports.
4.2.1 The Logic of NOCs
Before turning to a comparison of the NOCs in the BRIC countries, we first inves-
tigate the logic of why a country may choose to rationally establish an NOC and
under what conditions an NOC benefits a country and its people. First, countries
that are heavily dependent on oil production may choose to establish an NOC to
develop oil and gas resources to maximize social welfare rather than profits. These
two goals may come into conflict in this context when it is closer to socially op-
timal to develop resources over a longer time frame than a profit-maximizing firm
would. There is substantial evidence that the reserve to production ratio is higher
for NOCs than independent oil companies (IOCs) (Wolf, 2009). This suggests that
NOCs produce reserves more slowly, suggesting that NOCs better correct the inter-
generational externality of short-term overproduction at the cost of the welfare of
future generations.11 However, this could be a misleading statistic, as NOCs may
over-develop resources into reserves for political purposes. Second, in countries that
are dependent on either imports or exports of oil and gas as a large fraction of their
domestic economy, oil and gas markets may simply be too important to be left to
market forces. Through an NOC, governments increase their market share of oil
and gas production, and in some cases gain monopoly power. With greater control
of supply and prices, NOCs allow welfare to be more closely managed. Third, given
11Another explation can be found in 4.2.2.
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limited political resources, it may simply be more effective to create a monopolistic
NOC because of the natural monopoly characteristics of resource extraction (i.e. ge-
ographically concentrated factor inputs, highly specialized and specific knowledge,
high infrastructure costs, large economies of scale, etc.). Further, the political costs
of establishing new regulatory and enforcing bodies can be avoided by consolidating
operators and regulators under the single umbrella of a state-controlled company.
Fourth, because NOCs are not bound to the desires of public shareholders, NOCs
can enter international markets that are not accessible by IOCs, thus increasing
access to energy supply. For example, PetroChina was able to enter into oil produc-
tion in Sudan while an IOC would have been prevented from doing so (Oil & Gas
Financial Journal, 2010). Finally, NOCs afford central governments greater control
over an important sector of an economy enabling forms of “resource nationalism.”
With this perspective, NOCs can be used as political tools to extend the power of
the state into both foreign and domestic policy.
4.2.2 How NOCs can be Suboptimal
Depending on the desired outcome, NOCs may be a less desirable structure for large
oil and gas companies. First, relative to IOCs, NOCs, may under invest in resource
and reserve basin management as the incentives for an NOC may not be aligned
with profitability. With a government guarantee and limited competition, execu-
tives and non-government shareholders can be isolated from an NOC’s suboptimal
business practices. Second, NOC activities may be closely tied to the idiosyncrasies
of governing regimes. With substantial political realignment, change of political pri-
orities, or some other political shock external to the firm, NOC operating behavior
could dramatically shift as a result of forces an IOC would have been immune from.
Third, market distortions can be more covertly introduced in resource markets. As
these markets are typically international in scope, regional distortions may have
undesirable consequences for other regions, particularly resource importing regions.
It may be particularly undesirable for energy resource market manipulations to be
dependent on political forces intrinsically tied to foreign and domestic affairs.
4.2.3 Data
Data on crude oil and natural gas reserves and production for 2009 were collected
from the annual reports published by the seven companies in this study. Data
from the annual reports were corroborated with data from the Oil and Gas Journal.
Reserve and production data were disaggregated into domestic and international (to
the firm) activity. For all data except PetroChina’s oil and gas production, this data
was presented in the annual reports. For PetroChina, the firm’s total production
data from its annual report was scaled by the ratio of domestic revenue to total
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revenue. Production and reserve data for the BRIC countries was obtained from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) for 2009. Since firms reported
oil and gas activity in a variety of units, conversion ratios were also obtained from
the EIA.
The government’s ownership stake in each firm was presented in every annual
report. All seven firms have the government as the majority shareholder. The
lowest voting equity share of the seven firms is for OAO Gazprom at just over 50%
while the highest government voting equity share is for PetroChina at 86.3%.
4.2.4 Government Control of Resources
To measure the degree of control governments exert on energy supply through NOCs,
we were interested in measuring the share of domestic oil and gas production and
reserves attributable to NOCs. In oil reserves, the two Russian NOCs controlled
the smallest share of domestic oil reserves with a combined 46% of Russian oil
reserves. However, in magnitude, the oil reserves held by OAO Gazprom and Rosneft
were larger than the reserves held by any of the other countries largest NOCs and
almost equal in magnitude (>90%) to the oil reserves of China, Brazil and India’s
NOCs. China’s three major NOCs control over 90% of Chinese oil reserves. In
oil production, Petrobras is essentially the only producer of oil in Brazil with an
estimated 101% market share (the additional percent above 100% is likely due to
rounding error). The smallest share of NOC oil production is in Russia where
Gazprom and Rosneft together only produced 30% of Russian oil in 2009. Lukoil,
a privately-held oil company produced nearly 20% of domestic Russian oil in 2009.
Figure 8 shows the share of oil production by NOCs in the BRIC countries.
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Figure 8: Domestic Crude Oil Production by NOCs in BRIC Countries (2009) 
          China          Russia 
  



























Source: 8 annual reports, U.S. Energy Information Administration.
In natural gas reserves, India’s ONGC has the smallest share of domestic gas
reserves at 32% of India’s total, while Chinese NOCs control the greatest share
of domestic Chinese gas reserves at 90%. In magnitude, the natural gas reserves
of Russian firms, while only 40% of the Russian total, are more than six times
larger than the combined gas reserves of the five other NOCs in BRIC countries.
In gas production, there appears to substantial data misreporting among Chinese
firms. Combined, PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC claim to have produced 25%
more natural gas in China in 2009 than the EIA attributes to all of China. Pos-
sible explanations for this anomaly are inaccurate country level data reported by
the Chinese government, inaccurate data reported by firms in their annual reports,
a discrepancy in the definition of natural gas product classes, or an erroneous as-
sumption that domestic gas production is proportional to the share of PetroChina’s
revenue from domestic sources. ONGC in India has the lowest NOC-controlled share
of domestic gas production. Figure 9 shows the share of natural gas production by
NOCs in BRIC countries.
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Figure 9: Domestic Natural Gas Production by NOCs in BRIC Countries (2009) 
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Source: 8 annual reports, U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be acknowledged. As government
controlled companies, there are few incentives for NOCs to accurately report reserve
data. Politically, under some circumstances, it could be beneficial to signal exag-
gerated reserve estimates – thereby creating an incentive to develop resource bases
into reserves when otherwise doing so would be uneconomical. Further there are
definitional reasons for “reserves” that may suggest that reserve estimates have been
recorded inconsistently. However, most claims by the firms studied here have been
independently audited. Nevertheless, the data extracted from the annual reports of
the NOCs should be taken with a grain of salt.
4.2.5 Openness to Foreign Investment and Expansion of International Activity
The share of NOC ownership gives an indication to the extent that domestic oil and
gas markets are available to private market actors and foreign investment. Using the
metric of share of oil and gas production by NOC firms, Russian oil or Indian natural
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gas appear to be the largest markets for private and foreign investment. This metric
also indicates that Brazilian oil and Chinese natural gas are the markets most closed
to private or foreign investment. The openness of energy resource markets could be
interpreted as inversely proportional to the resource nationalism governments exert
on oil and gas markets. However, governments may also choose to open domestic oil
and gas markets to bring in foreign expertise and investment for reasons not directly
related to securing energy supply.
Recently, NOCs, particularly from India and China, have expanded their explo-
ration and production activities abroad. With diminishing domestic resources, in-
ternal NOC decision makers and their government owners have pushed for increased
access to global resource supplies. In the BRIC countries, India’s ONGC holds the
highest fraction of its reserves internationally. 20% of ONGC’s oil reserves and 21%
of its natural gas reserves are located outside of India. Not by accident, India also has
the smallest oil reserves and second smallest (after Brazil) gas reserves of the BRIC
countries. The Russian NOCs remain heavily domestically focused with the largest
domestic oil and gas reserves of any BRIC country NOC. Petrobras in Brazil also
remains largely inwardly focused, concentrating efforts strongly on commercializing
domestically available resources.
International exploration and production is one form of energy supply diversifi-
cation. This type of diversification helps protect NOC supply from regional distur-
bances that could affect the availability of supply (e.g. natural disasters, conflict,
etc.) as well as from potential price spikes. However, regional diversification in-
curs additional costs from increased transport distances, the development of region-
specific extraction knowledge and technology, and the fostering of political and reg-
ulatory relationships and trust in new regions. Further, diversification abroad can
induce competition between oil companies attempting to claim production rights
over the same resource base.
The relative regional diversification of India’s NOC and relative domestic focus
of Russia’s NOCs provide evidence for the intuitive inverse relationship between
domestic resources and international diversification of energy supply. Limited do-
mestic resources relative to demand may drive governments to diversify the resource
portfolios of their NOCs internationally. How aggressively NOCs pursue interna-
tional resource supply (or, for energy exporters, international resource demand) is
well predicted by the governance modalities of the NOC’s government owner.
4.2.6 Governance and NOC Resource Contracts: India vs. China
China and India, as major energy importers, use their NOCs to aggressively pursue
international energy supply. However, the governance styles of the two countries help
to explain the differential success rates of Chinese and Indian NOCs in actually at-
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taining contested resource rights. The effect of governance on securing international
energy supply through an NOC is well illustrated by events in the past year when
Chinese NOCs outbid Indian NOCs for over $12.5 billion in oil and gas contracts.
In the past five years, Chinese NOCs have directly bid against Indian NOCs and
won contracts in Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Venezuela, Angola, and Uganda (Katakey,
2010). It is also likely that Chinese firms have won even more contracts in compe-
tition with Indian firms unobserved because Indian firms did not make an official
bid. Chinese NOCs were able to win contracts in competition with Indian NOCs
in part because of more readily available financing, favorable exchange rates, and
existing foreign currency reserves. However, another important driver in Chinese
NOC success in winning international oil and gas contracts has been the Chinese
central government’s preemptive negotiations to provide financing and aid to coun-
tries ahead of the bidding process for their oil and gas resource rights. The ability
to provide aid and financing to these countries to implicitly secure resource rights is
suspected by many observes to be greatly facilitated by China’s more authoritarian
government (Bloomberg Business Week, 2005).
In addition to combining the central government’s capability to provide aid and
financing to other countries with NOC activity, the central government has also used
its military to facilitate oil and gas resource rights. In the East China Sea between
China and Japan, offshore oil and gas resources lie in ambiguously defined territory.
In September 2005, China sent five armed naval vessels near a natural gas field in the
East China Sea to intimidate would-be Japanese resource developers (French, 2005).
Such drastic measures are representative of the type of decisions that authoritarian
governments can make with little domestic check or repercussion.
To secure energy supply, NOCs are used as tools by both democratic and author-
itarian governments to expand their sphere of influence. Even though the evidence
suggest that privatization of NOCs would lead to more efficient resource extraction
(Wolf, 2009), developing country governments are willing to forgo these additional
benefits, at least for the time being, to guarantee access to fossil energy resources.
While all four BRIC countries use NOCs to guarantee security of supply, the govern-
ments of China and Russia, the more authoritarian of the four, also employ other
capabilities of their government in conjunction with their NOCs. By integrating
NOC activity with other government functions, relative to Brazil and India, China
and Russia are more readily able to 1) expand their sphere of influence beyond se-
curing energy resource supply, using NOCs as extensions of the arm of the central
government and 2) increase their effectiveness in securing contested energy resources.
Further, the governments of China and Russia are willing to use their militaries to
support their policy goals in conjunction with their national oil companies, bringing
security of energy supply one step closer to the realm of national security.
Coming back to our first hypothesis, the subsections above demonstrate how au-
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thoritarian regimes utilize NOCs in order to sustain control over resources and there-
fore, the capability to control the security of energy supply. Politics enter the sphere
of oil and gas supply at various ends, e.g. when international negotiations take place
or the military supports security of energy supply. Especially China seems to be far
more capable to act rapidly, forcefully and financially potent than Russia and its
democratic counterparts.
5 Conclusion
Conventional sources of energy will become more and more scarce as demand for
energy resources continues to rise to new levels. While reserves of coal, oil, and gas
are geographically diversified, in a globalized world, managing energy resource trade
and ensuring access to energy natural resources has become a defining characteristic
of security policy. The growth in demand for energy resources is fueled by rapid
economic expansion in the developing countries. Brazil, Russia, India, and China,
the BRIC countries, are the largest rapidly developing countries: in the past decade
nearly one-quarter of global GDP growth occurred in these four countries alone. Yet
despite the BRIC countries’ collective success in achieving economic growth, their
approaches to political governance stand in stark contrast to one another. Russia
and China approach governance from an authoritarian history while Brazil and India
are established democracies. The past decade’s history in the BRIC countries has
proved that both authoritarian and democratic governments can achieve economic
growth. However, if one of the defining challenges of the coming decades is to secure
energy supply, it will become important to ask if both authoritarian and democratic
governments will again be able to succeed.
In this paper, we presented the challenge of energy security as defined by two
classes of metrics: the availability of fossil energy reserves, and the de-concentration
and de-centralization of energy generation. Next, we developed a theoretical frame-
work to situate energy security policy making in the context of governance regimes
with alternative political motivations. Finally, we tested the theoretical framework
in the context of two comparative case studies one on hydroelectric power and one
on national oil companies. By comparing Brazil and India with Russia and China,
we were able to control for several of the important similarities that all four BRIC
countries share: the relative size of their populations and the size and rate of growth
of their economies. This framework allowed us to come closer to isolating the causal
effect of governance on energy security policy.
Our pair of comparative case studies in tandem with the quantification of energy
security metrics provides evidence for how authoritarian governments shape energy
security policy to achieve their objectives. Particularly, the energy security policy
established by authoritarian governments are heavily influenced by their objective to
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seek control and power. We find that in states with authoritarian governance, power
production is more concentrated than in democratic countries, facilitating control
over the supply of energy services. Second, we find that states with democratic
governance better internalize the social and environmental costs of developing energy
generation units. Finally, we find that how authoritarian governments utilize their
national oil companies reflect both their ability to exert their power through multiple
channels and their desire to control and directly benefit from natural resources.
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